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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ELLA H. BEEZLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-




Third Party Defendant. 
Case No. 8411 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RESTATEMENT OF CASE 
In the Brief of the defendant, William L. Beezley, 
there is what is designated as a Statement of Facts which 
is a mere statement of that part of the testimony of Mr. 
Beezley when viewed in a light most favorable to him. 
For the Court to get a proper understanding of the case, 
it is necessary, at the outset, to give a brief summary 
of the evidence received. Numerous ple.adings and mo-
tions were filed in the cause, but as the appellant makes 
no claim that error was committed in the rulings made 
thereon, no useful purpose will be served by a discussion 
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of the pleadings. Suffice it to say that the action was 
commenced on May 8 1952 but was not tried until April 
' ' 19, 1954 and w.as not decided until July 26, 1955. Much 
of the delay was caused by stipulations of the parties as 
well as by numerous motions and amended pleadings. 
The action is founded on the claim of the plaintiff that 
the defendant was guilty of cruelty causing gre.at mental 
distress to the plaintiff. 
Elias Hansen was made a third party defendant. 
The relief sought against him was for an accounting of 
the rents and profits made in the operation of the prop-
erty at 150 South 7th East. The action as to him was 
dismissed no cause of action. No complaint is made by 
appellant as to such ruling. 
In none of the pleadings filed by William L. Beezley 
did he pray judgment th.at plaintiff be denied a decree of 
divorce. In his pleadings he sought judgment that he be 
awarded a one-half of the interest of the plaintiff in and 
to the property located at 150 South 7th East. As here-
tofore stated, defendant has apparently referred to the 
evidence upon which he relies for the relief prayed for by 
him, but has not given the Court any information as to 
plaintiff's evidence. 
The following is a summary of the evidence offered 
on behalf of the plaintiff: 
Sarah Careman Martin in substance testified: That 
she resided in the El Vigo Apartn1ents at 150 South 
7th East, in Salt Lake City, for nine years and about 
eight months. She Inoved to Garfield last July. That 
while she resided in the El Vigo Apartments she occupied 
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an apartment on the third floor immediately above the 
apartment occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Beezley. Elias 
Hansen after the de.ath of his wife occupied the apart-
ment immediately above that occupied by the Martins. 
(Tr. 10 - R. 107.) (In the course of this brief we shall 
refer to the pages of the transcript because that is the 
page shown in the index to the transcript.) That the 
bedroom occupied by the Martins was just above the 
bedroom occupied by the Beezleys. That Mr. Beezley 
would come in late .at night and he seemed to always be 
so quarrelsome and he seemed to always have it in for 
Mrs. Beezley. I can truthfully say I have never heard 
such vile language, such cursing and carrying on as I 
heard from him, and he used to keep us aw.ake from two 
to three o'clock in the morning. At first such actions 
occurred around the weekends. As time went on, it seem-
ed to be two or three times a week. That his actions 
grew worse as time went on. That during "the last three 
or four months he was there it was unbearable. I don't 
know how Mrs. Beezley ever stood it. She used to come 
up the next morning and apologize, she knew we had 
been disturbed, she c.ame up and apologized. She felt 
terrible about it." To the question, "To your knowledge, 
was anybody else disturbed," she answered: "I heard a 
great number in the apartment at that time, you know, 
wonder how she could put up with it." I would see him 
several times when he would be coming in the apartment, 
be in front of the building, and he would come home in 
a taxi and I would see the t.axi driver help him in the 
apartment. He was unable to walk himself (Tr. 11). 
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"One night about ten o'clock at night (he came to 
the witness' apartment) he rang the door bell, we were 
asleep and by the time I got to the door, I thought he 
was going to break it down, he was hammering so hard 
and I put the chain on it. I didn't know who it was. He 
said: 'I want my wife.' I said: 'She isn't here.' He said: 
'I want my wife.' I said: 'She isn't here.' He said: 'I 
want my wife.' I said: 'She isn't here.' He said: 'I want 
my wife.' And I thought he thought he was up to Judge 
Hansen's apartment. I finally closed the door in his face 
and finally heard him stumble downstairs, he was so 
drunk he could hardly walk; he came to my apartment 
twice. That at times it sounded like he was shoving things 
around in the kitchen and bedroom, and sometimes I 
guess, it would be when he would fall, it would almost jar 
the building and I could hear ~Irs. Beezley trying to quiet 
him down, keep him quiet." That during the period from 
1945 to 1953 the witness never saw Mrs. Beezley inebri-
ated. That the witness never saw Mr. Beezley do any 
manual work about the apartment house, not even water 
the lawn (Tr. 12). 1\frs. Beezley did it continually. He 
did nothing about renting the .apartments or collecting 
the rent, that was done by ~frs. Beezley. That ~Ir. 
Hansen dug out a cellarway to make room for lockers, 
and did some painting. That the witness ne\er saw Mr. 
Beezley do any painting; "that outside of cursing and 
swearing I heard him (defendant) accuse her (plaintiff) 
one time she was stepping out, because she had come home 
from a picture show." 
On cross-examination she testified that she had not 
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gone over her testimony with Mrs. Beezley but that she 
talked with Mr. Iverson a few minutes this morning. 
That the witness knew nothing about Mr. Beezley claim-
ing any interest in the apartment. That when the apart-
ment house was purchased, Mr. and Mrs. Beezley came 
to the witness' .apartment and stated that Mrs. Beezley 
and her father were purchasing the apartment and want-
ed to know if the Martins were willing to move out of the 
apartment that they were occupying (Tr. 14). That dur-
ing the time the witness lived at the El Vigo Apartment 
a caretaker did the janitor work, but not the cleaning of 
the .apartment (Tr.15). That during the time the witness 
lived at the apartment the papering was done by paper-
hangers but Mrs. Beezley did most of the painting. That 
the witness could not hear noises from the apartments 
across the hall. That at one time she heard disturbances 
in the basement (Tr. 16). That some people came in a 
car about daylight and a man's wife was there and going 
to kill someone. They were out on the sidewalk; that the 
witness heard Mrs. Beezley at times talk loud when she 
tried to quiet Mr. Beezley (Tr. 17). That the witness did 
not move out of the apartment she was occupying because 
Mrs. Beezley w.as so nice to us and she liked her apart-
ment and didn't want to tell Mrs. Beezley that they were 
moving out because her husband caused so much disturb-
ance. 
Ella H. Beezley testified in substance as follows: 
That she is the plaintiff in this action and a daughter 
of Judge Hansen, who is also a defendant. That before 
her marriage, she taught school and saved a little more 
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than $1000.00 which she loaned to her father just before 
her marriage ; that she has resided in Salt Lake City 
ever since her marriage; that when she was first married 
she and her husband got along fine; that when first 
married she and her husband fixed up the amusement 
room in her father's and mother's home where they 
lived (Tr. 19). They lived there about a year and did not 
pay any rent. They then purchased .a home on Harrison 
A venue for $2700.00 with a down payment of $250.00 and 
the balance at the rate of $30.00 per month. That she 
told her father that she and her husband were buying 
a home and asked him for the .amount of the down pay-
ment of $250.00, which he paid to her by a check for that 
amount. That as the monthly payments became due, the 
father of the witness gave her a check which she in turn 
gave to Mr. Beezley to pay on the purchase price of the 
home. That they lived in the Harrison ~.\venue home for 
about two years (Tr. 20). That they ran out of money 
and were unable to make the payments on the home and 
moved back to the home of the witness' parents. That 
they continued to reside with plaintiff's parents for about 
a year .and a half or two years and rented the Harrison 
A venue home and used the money reserved for rent to 
make the payments on the Harrison A venue property. 
That after they left the h01ne of plaintiff's parents, they 
separated for a time and becmne reconciled. Defendant's 
drinking entered into the reason for the separation. That 
the witness was operated upon and her father paid for 
the same. That they moved back to Harrison A venue 
and within four months thereafter the defendant began 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
drinking again. They remained in the Harrison A venue 
home for about a year (Tr. 21). That the witness saw 
that they were about to lose the Harrison A venue prop-
erty and the witness found it difficult to get a job as a 
teacher and the witness sought the aid of her f.ather to get 
money to purchase some income property. That the wit-
ness and Mr. Beezley traded some canyon lots on the 
purchase price of a home on 9th Avenue. That the wit-
ness and her father purchased a home on 6th East and 
soon there.after sold the same for a profit. That there-
after the witness purchased the Monteray Apartments 
on 7th South and used $200.00 of the profit she made on 
the 6th East property as her share of the down payment. 
That she told her father at the time of the purchase of 
the property on 7th South that .a profit was made on the 
purchase and sale of the 6th East property and asked her 
father to go in with her on the purchase of the 7th South 
property. That the 7th South property was purchased, 
the down payment being $5000.00, of which amount 
$200.00 was p.aid by the witness and $4800.00 by her 
father; that $4000.00 of the payment made by the wit-
ness' father was secured by a note and mortgage given 
by the parents of the witness (Tr. 22). That the purchase 
price of the 7th South property was $12,500.00. That in 
order to raise sufficient money to pay for the property 
on 7th South, it was necessary to give Tr:acy's a mortgage 
for $7000.00. That to get the loan, Tracy's requested that 
Mr. Beezley sign the note and mortgage. That Mr. 
Beezley objected to signing the note and mortgage, that 
the witness was anxious to have Mr. Beezley sign the 
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note and mortgage, so that they could save the Harrison 
home by renting it. That Mr. Beezley did sign the note 
and mortgage; that he did not claim any interest in the 
property on 7th South when he signed the note and mort-
gage. That the witness made payments to Tracys of 
about $70.00 per month (Tr. 23); that the property on 
7th South was run down .and the witness was unable to 
keep up the payments from the income derived from the 
property and was compelled to borrow money from her 
father to keep up the payments. That the money bor-
rowed was in addition to the down payment of $4800.00; 
that the witness could not have payed for the property 
without borrowing money from her father. That at the 
beginning the witness felt she could pay for the property 
on 7th South and gave her father a mortgage for $9500.00, 
the same being the amount he had put into the property. 
In 1945 the witness and her father purchased the 7th 
East property known as the El Vigo. That the witness 
did not have enough money to make her one-half of the 
down payment (Tr. 24). That the price paid for the El 
Vigo was $65,000.00 of which $19,500.00 was the down 
p.ay1nent; that the ~Ionteray apartment was sold for 
$27,000.00; that the witness' father had a mortgage for 
$9,500.00; that the share of the witness in the money re-
ceived from the ~1onteray aparbnent was $8500.00; that 
the deed to the apartn1ent on 7th East was given to the 
parents of the witness who in turn conveyed an undivided 
one-half interest therein to the witness. That since the 
purchase of the apartment on 7th East known as the El 
Vigo the witness has operated the apartment; that the 
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witness gets paid $70.00 per month and the use of an 
apartment. Her father pays $70.00 per month rent for 
his apartment. That Mr. Beezley has not had anything 
to do with the operation of the El Vigo apartment; that 
he claimed no interest therein prior to July 17, 1953. 
He claimed no interest in the Monteray apartment, but 
complained because of being required to sign the note 
and mortgage (Tr. 26). That the Harrison Ave. property 
was sold in about 1946. They received about $5000.00 
cash from the sale which was used to purchase the prop-
erty on 9th South which Mr. Beezley now calls the El 
Dumpo property. It consists of four apartments. That 
Mr. Beezley has collected the rents from the El Dumpo 
property and has managed the same (Tr. 27). 
That during the last three years living with him 
(Mr. Beezley) has been almost intolerable. It has injured 
my health and I went to the hospital soon after the suit 
was filed. That the tenants in the apartment came to the 
witness and asked her to have him put in an asylum. The 
witness asked him to move out and see if they could work 
things out, but he refused to do so. That when he, defend-
ant, came home late at night he used vile and obscene 
language. It was various embarrassing names such as 
whore and bitch; he used s____ of a B ________ almost every 
other word, until the language was humiliating and de-
grading to the extent it was a danger to my health, and 
I could hardly stand to face the tenants the next morning, 
I was so humiliated. He yelled very loud. I tried to stop 
the yelling and many, many times I would go to a show at 
night so he couldn't say things to me and sometimes when 
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I would get home, sometimes he would continue all night 
long. The last three months before the separation it (his 
behavior) came at least every other night, as often as 
every other night I could expect it-in fact about five 
o'clock at night I would get right sick to my stomach 
knowing this awful thing I would have to go through, 
and sometimes he wouldn't go to bed at all. There is 
absolutely no truth to the statement that the witness was 
coerced into bringing her suit for a divorce by her father 
(Tr. 29). Not only would he blaspheme me, but my father 
and dead mother, which was upsetting to me. That in 
about 1940 the witness and his brother, while drinking 
to excess came to the Monteray apartment and started 
harassing the witness, she did not risk calling the police 
and she called her father if he would come by and stop 
this terrible language and terrible goings-on; that she 
never called the police; that to do so she feared would 
only make things worse ( Tr. 30). That the witness' father 
had nothing to do with the witness securing an order 
restraining the defendant from going to the apartment 
( Tr. 29). That before the restraining order was dismiss-
ed, the defendant agreed to refrain from going to the El 
Vigo apartment; that quite a while after the suit was 
commenced, the defendant called upon this witness and 
stated that he w.as sorry for what he had done and he 
was going to quit; that the witness replied that if they 
could work something out, be happy and congenial she 
was willing; that she took a course on alcoholism feeling 
that maybe she could learn son1ething to solve their prob-
lem, and that a reconciliation might be had if he would 
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try to overcome this habit and violence. That the witness 
went down to the El Dumpo apartment and helped the 
defendant paint and fix up his apartment (Tr. 30). 
That at times she stayed with him at night and cohabit-
ated with him for a period of about a year; that she went 
to the AA meeting with him, but she was unwilling to take 
him back to the apartment because she was afraid of his 
drinking habit. That she suggested that they purchase 
some more property in connection with the property on 
9th South and live there; that she would come down there 
to live; that she would continue to manage the El Vigo 
apartment, collect all rents and use the money to buy a 
car and help out (Tr. 31). To that suggestion the defend-
ant said, "that isn't the way I will do it. If you will ask 
your father to leave we will go back to the apartment and 
you will give me half of your equity." To which the 
plaintiff responded, "That is no use, if that is your atti-
tude. I want to see if we can work out a marriage and I 
have worked so hard to work out a security. If you pull 
the security out from under me, I will have to put up with 
hell and drink and lose my security and he would have a 
foothold over me. More or less over a barrel. I said, "If 
that is what you are interested in rather than making 
up, there is no use trying," and I have had nothing to 
do with him after that. He wanted to go back and I said 
if you are going in for the drink and it is more than father 
could stand, the vile language and the tenants had come 
to my father and made complaint to him and I s.aid it is 
more than I can stand and I don't think he would appre-
ciate us going back to the apartment. If we will live 
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away from there I thought it would be better. My father 
didn't mind if he didn't drink and carry on, he didn't 
want that and I didn't want it (Tr. 32). The next day 
after the conversation on July 16th or 17th, 1953 he 
(defendant) served me with papers, and when I entered 
into this condonance I asked him if he would keep it quiet, 
not use it against me, I thought a person didn't want it 
brought out in court. He said he would. The language 
he used in the papers served upon me used language 
stronger than I thought needed-I thought all the cohabi-
tation stuff was crude and unjust. He was determined 
to get one-half of the interest of the plaintiff in the apart-
ment; that she said that if that is the way you are going 
to be, I don't see how we can reconcile ( Tr. 33). That 
he served a lot of papers on me from time to time and 
sued my father for $50,000.00, which I thought was ridicu-
lous, which made me think he wasn't sincere. He was 
more concerned about getting publicity and it was the 
drink problem that was causing us not to get together. 
That when my deposition was taken they kept going over 
and over again the fact that we had eohabitated. I 
thought that is personal and he pronlised not to go into 
that (Tr. 34). In this connection the attention of the 
Court is directed to the deposition of the plaintiff which 
was received in evidence, and to pages 5, 6, 8, 12, 16, 20, 
21, 38, 39, 40, 42, 47, 48, 70 and 71. Defendant and his 
counsel continued to interrogate the witness about the 
intercourse, and when .and how many tiines it occurred 
until counsel for :.Mrs. Beezley advised her not to answer. 
See deposition of plaintiff, page 71. 
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Returning to the transcript, 1frs. Beezley further 
testified that the conversations had with Mr. Beezley on 
July 16th and 17th caused her to be terribly upset. 
It was the most confusing and harassing thing I ever 
had in our home life. When I said overcome the drink 
problem, he said that is ,a small part, I want your prop-
erty. I want security. I felt this, if he got half of my 
property and we went back together and he started drink-
ing, I would have to put up with it the rest of my life or 
lose security. That after the El Vigo apartn1ent was pur-
chased the witness' father put an additional $33,000.00 
for g.arages, buying new furniture and paying off part 
of mortgage (R. 35). That there is still owing on the 
mortgage on the property about $5300.00, about $2700.00 
from conversion to gas, $200.00 for furniture and various 
bills. (The amount owing for furniture was later correct-
ed to be $2700.00.) (Tr. 62) That since the El Vigo was 
purchased the witness and her father have regularly 
made out partnership returns on the El Vigo. The wit-
ness and 1\fr. Beezley never filed a partnership return. 
That J\!Ir. Beezley wrote the letter, Plaintiff's proposed 
Exhibit One, during the time the witness and her husband 
were attempting to effect a reconciliation (Tr. 36). De-
fendant objected to the admission of the letter because 
of being against public policy. The court took the matter 
of its admission under .advisement. The letter is dated 
September 5, 1952 and provides that in consideration of 
Mrs. Beezley granting an extension of time to December 
15, 1952 for Mr. Beezley to plead that he, Mr. Beezley will 
consent that Mrs. Beezley get a divorce and that the 
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defendant would give a quit claim deed to the plaintiff 
to the 7th East property and the plaintiff would give to 
the defendant a quit claim deed to the 9th South prop-
erty (Tr. 37). That all of the money the witness' father 
owed her some $1200.00 or $1500.00 was paid on the 
Harrison Ave. property. The money was paid to the wit-
ness with checks by her father and endorsed by the wit-
ness and given to the defendant who paid Durtschi, the 
one selling the property (Tr. 39-41). That when the 
Harrison Ave. property was sold, the money was used 
to purchase the property on 9th South and the title placed 
in their joint names (Tr. 42). That the witness paid 
$200.00 and her father $4800.00 on the down payment on 
the purchase price of the ~Ionteray or 7th South prop-
erty (Tr. 43). That Mr. Beezley did some work such as 
watering and cutting the lawn and carrying out the gar-
bage. That during the time that the Beezleys were living 
in the Monteray apartment a club known as the Salt Lake 
Beautification Association was formed by a Mrs. Lund 
and .a :Mr. Brewster and the .Beezleys were members and 
~{r. Beezley was active in it ( Tr. 44). Its main purpose 
was to stop the influx of colored and undesirable people, 
and to keep up their pre1nises (Tr. ±5). That the or-
ganization was finally disorganized (Tr. 46). That at 
the tiine Exhibit one was signed, the Beezleys were at-
teinpting .a reconciliation (Tr. 47). That the witness was 
afraid of 1\Ir. Beezley and had experienced physical vio-
lence; that she dis1nissed the restraining order upon the 
request of Mr. Beezley upon his prOinise that he would 
not cause any disturbance (Tr. 49). That the plaintiff 
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did everything she could to break the defendant from 
drinking; it was his excessive drinking and the behavior 
that went with the drinking that she objected to (Tr. 52). 
That the witness joined the AA to get the defendant to 
join. That the witness does not know whether the defend-
ant has quit drinking, but has heard that he has (Tr. 53). 
That the witness believes that the defendant was guilty 
of fraud in entering into an arrangement for condona-
tion because he said he would not go back together unless 
the witness gave him a one-half interest in her property; 
that she didn't think that the defendant could take away 
property which she had secured with the aid of her 
father (Tr. 54). That at times the defendant said he had 
an interest in plaintiff's property and at other times he 
said he did not. That the witness was willing to give 
the defendant her interest in 9th South to get peace. 
Usually a man gives a wife alimony, but in this case I 
was willing to give that to him (Tr. 56). That in giving 
him her interest in the 9th South property, she would 
be giving him $7500.00 if the property is worth $15,000.00 
as he claims; that the fact that the witness desired a quit 
claim deed to the 7th East property does not necessarily 
mean that the defendant had an interest in the same; that 
the witness did not like these court cases (Tr. 57). That 
the witness desired a reconciliation and to buy property 
on 9th South, but the defendant said "No, I will not go 
back together unless we move back to the El Vigo." (Tr. 
58). 
Elias Hansen was called as a witness and in sub-
stance testified as follows: 
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That he is a member of the bar of the State of Utah; 
that when Mr. and Mrs. Beezley were living in the Monte-
ray apartments, Mrs. Beezley called the witness and in-
formed him that her husband and Robert were raising 
hell down there and asked him to come down and attempt 
to do something about it. That he went down there and 
met Oliver Olsen in the hall, who told the witness that 
Robert and William were accusing Ella and Olsen of 
having improper relations; that there was nothing to it 
and they were just raising hell in there. That when the 
witness went in, they were both drunk and Ella told the 
witness what her trouble was and the witness told Mrs. 
Beezley that she did not have to put up with this sort of 
thing; that if she didn't want to she could come home 
and live with us, or if it continues, break up your mar-
riage with Bill (Tr. 71). Bill spoke up and said, "Don't 
do that, don't do that." That is the only time the matter 
of divorce was ever mentioned, until at about the time 
she brought her suit. That the witness advised her that 
he couldn't serve as her attorney; that perhaps the wit-
ness would be a witness, and if she deternlln.ed she and 
Mr. Beezley couldn't get along, she would have to em-
ploy another attorney, but that the witness would from 
time to time tell her what to do; that the witness knew 
that his daughter and Mr. Beezley were having trouble 
some months before she filed her action. That the witness 
was living on the top floor in the ap.artinent house and 
Martins were in between the witness and the apartment 
occupied by the Beezleys. That particularly during the 
two weeks next preceeding the tune the action for divorce 
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was brought, when the witness went to bed at about 
10:00 o'clock, his bedroom being directly over the 
Beezleys, the witness heard Mr. Beezley at least every 
other night carrying on down there, God-damning and 
calling Mrs. Beezley a God-damned whore and things of 
that sort; that kept up until about five o'clock in the 
morning, then he would quiet down; that unfortunately 
the witness did not interfere. That on three or four occa-
sions Mr. Beezley came up to the apartment of the wit-
ness, which was on the top floor and asked if Ella was 
there ( Tr. 71). That at least three times she was not, 
and on one occasion, he, Mr. Beezley, said the witness 
was a God-damned liar and started down stairs; that 
the witness turned on the light and saw that Mrs. Beezley 
had come in unknown to him and was lying on the couch 
in the front room. On another occasion Mrs. Beezley call-
ed the witness down to her apartment ,and said that she 
wanted something done with Bill; that the witness asked 
why she, Mrs. Beezley, did not call the police, to which 
she replied that she did not want to do that because to call 
them would get this thing advertised. That when the wit-
ness went down to the Beezley apartment, Mr. Beezley 
went into the bathroom and locked the door; that the 
witness told Mrs. Beezley that she could come up and stay 
with the witness to which Mrs. Beezley replied that she 
was afraid that he would break up the furniture; that 
when the witness returned to his apartment he heard 
Mr. Beezley carrying on ashe had been. 
That at the time the Monteray property was pur-
chased, he told Mr. Beezley that in order to finance the 
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deal and secure the money from Tracy Loan & Trnst 
Company it was necessary for Mr. Beezley to sign the 
note and mortgage with Mrs. Beezley (Tr. 72). That 
Tracys stated that they wished Mr. Beezley to sign the 
note and mortgage because he might make a claim of a 
homestead if they lived there and it was contrary to their 
practice to make a loan to a wife unless the husband 
signed, particularly if they were going to occupy the 
property; that the witness took the matter up with Mr. 
Beezley, who s.aid that he didn't know why he should sign 
the note and mortgage because he didn't own any of the 
property. That the witness told Mr. Beezley that it was 
up to him that if he didn't sign the deal would probably 
blow up. So he signed under those circumstances. That 
when the witness became involved in the deal for the pur-
chase of the 7th South property that the witness told Mrs. 
Beezley that he did not want to go into the apartment 
house business, to which ~Irs. Beezley replied that she 
had to make a living and that if the witness would help 
her they could make a go of it. She had $200.00 growing 
out of a purchase of the Swartz house in a probate pro-
ceeding which was immediately sold at a profit and Mrs. 
Beezley had $200.00 left of her share of the profit which 
she applied on the down payment on the 7th South prop-
erty. The other $4800.00 of the down payment was made 
by the witness (Tr. 73). That at the time the 7th South 
property was purchased, the witness told the plaintiff 
that if she and the defendant could pay for the property 
they could have it .as the witness did not want to go into 
the apartment house business. That a short time after the 
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purchase, the plaintiff and defendant moved into the 
7th South property. That later she said that she did not 
think she could make a go of it at which time the witness 
stated that he would go into .a partnership agreement 
with her and see that the payments were made so that 
she would not lose the money that they had put in the 
property. That from time to time when she could not 
meet the payments or needed money for other purposes, 
the witness advanced the needed money. The property 
was run down and considerable money was needed for 
repairs and the purchase of new furniture. That when 
the property on 7th East was purchased, the title was 
taken in the name of the witness and his wife as joint 
tenants. A down payment of $19,500.00 was made and a 
mortgage for $45,500.00 was given on the property as the 
balance of the purchase price. The plaintiff also signed 
the note for the balance of the purchase price. The wit-
ness and his wife conveyed to the plaintiff an undivided 
one-half interest in the property on 7th East known as 
the El Vigo Apartments. 
That beginning in 1945, the witness and his daugh-
ter, the plaintiff, made and filed partnership tax returns. 
The first return included the profit made on the sale of 
the Monteray Apartment. That partnership returns have 
been filed every year since 1945 ( Tr. 7 4). That a written 
memorandum of the partnership was executed upon 
which is contained an annual settlement had by the wit-
ness and the plaintiff. Such memorandum was marked 
Exhibit 2 and received in evidence. That the witness had 
advanced a total sum of $35,502.34 in addition to the one-
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half of the $19,500.00 down payment (Tr. 75). Part of 
the $35,502.34 so advanced was applied on the payment of 
the rent on the .apartment which the witness occupied. 
That in addition to the amount shown by the last account 
on the memorandum of partnership agreement, the wit-
ness had advanced one check for $100.00, one check for 
$250.00, one check for $500.00 and another check for 
$600.00. The partnership pays the witness interest at 
4% per .annum on the amount advanced by the witness 
in excess of the amount advanced by the plaintiff. That 
the witness was paying $75.00 a month rental on the 
apartment occupied by him. That the property across the 
street from the apartment where the garages are built 
are a part of the property of the partnership. It is so 
provided in the partnership memorandum. The land cost 
$2000.00, building the garages cost $8500.00. All of the 
money was paid by the witness. None of it came from the 
income from the apartment (Tr. 76). That the witness 
got back out of the $2000.00 a part of the taxes for the 
year of the purchase. The owner paid the taxes for the 
portion of the year that he owned the same. That along 
in September 1953 I\Ir. Beezley came to the office of the 
witness and told the witness that he and Mrs. Beezley 
had been .attempting to affect a reconciliation, but they 
were not getting anywhere because Mrs. Beezley didn't 
want him back in the El Vigo apartn1ent. That the wit-
ness told I\fr. Beezley that if she wanted him to come 
back there, the witness had no objection to his coming 
back if he would behave himself and if Mrs. Beezley 
wanted him back. I\Ir. Beezley s.aid that 1\frs. Beezley 
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wanted him to come down and stay down to the apartment 
(on 9th South) or rent another place. The witness said, 
"I think that is perhaps foolish if you can patch up your 
difficulties." Then he, Mr. Beezley, began to talk about 
another difficulty he had with respect to her conveying 
to him one-half in the apartment house on 7th East. 
The witness then said, "Bill, what right have you got 
to that~" He said, "Well, I think I should have some 
interest in it." He s.aid, "When we bought the house up 
on Harrison Avenue that was put in their joint names and 
that he made the payments on the property." (Tr. 77). 
The witness said, "Now Bill, you know better than 
that." He said, "No, I made all the payments." The 
witness said no, he recalled when they were about to move 
in there Ella came to the witness and said they were about 
to buy a home on Harrison Ave. and asked the witness 
whether or not he could pay her some money he was 
owing her, the witness said, "Sure, at any time." That 
at that time the witness advanced her a payment of 
$250.00 and from month to month thereafter, Mrs. Beez-
ley would come to the witness and ask for additional 
money and the witness would give it to her. That the 
witness said to the defendant that he, Mr. Hansen, was 
owing his daughter something in excess of $1000.00 and 
some interest and that if she did not use the money to pay 
on the home what did she do with it, to which Mr. Beezley 
replied that he did not know what she did with it. De-
fendant further said that one of the conditions of a 
reconciliation was that he was to get an interest in the 
apartment house on 7th East. The witness asked Mr. 
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Beezley on what theory he could expect that, to which 
he responded that he did some work down at the other 
apartment and that l\1rs. Beezley had made no payments 
on the Harrison Ave. property, and he was going to insist 
on having half of her interest in the apartment on 7th 
East. The witness said, "Bill, you have about as much 
chance to get an interest in that property as I have to 
fly to the moon." To which Mr. Beezley replied, "Well, 
I can make a try for it." 
That Mr. Beezley then started to tell the witness 
about Mrs. Beezley. He said, "You think Ella is all good, 
she has been drunk and I have had to take her home." 
The witness said, "Bill, maybe you are right, I have never 
seen her drunk or heard of her being drunk," and Mr. 
Beezley then went on to tell (Tr. 78) the witness about 
one time he came home and heard some voices in the 
apartment where they were living; that before he was 
able to get in she was gone; that she couldn't have gone 
out of the apartment without some help; and he was sure 
she was in there with some other fellow~ that at the time 
of this conversation the witness told Mr. Beezley that 
even if he succeeded in establishing an interest in the 
aparbnent house the witness wouldn~t engage in the 
apartment house business with him, that he couldn't trust 
him; that he could break the1n financially if he (Beezley) 
behaved as he had been. As l\Ir. Beezley left he said, "I 
don't want to be in a partnership with you either." That 
the witness informed l\1rs. Beezley of the above conversa-
tion with Mr. Beezley. That he never told Mrs. Beezley 
that he would disown her if she went back to Bill· that 
' 
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he had observed the effect on Mrs. Beezley after she 
broke off her attempted reconciliation with Mr. Beezley 
(Tr. 79). That Mrs. Beezley was nervous and couldn't 
talk about anything except what she had done for Mr. 
Beezley and how he had reacted. 
That the witness went up to Yellowstone Park soon 
after the break up of the Beezleys; that Mrs. Beezley 
went with him; that they were unable to get sep.arate 
rooms, but compelled to get one room with two beds ; 
that the only thing she could talk about was her troubles 
with Bill and how he had tried to beat her out of her 
property. At night she would wake up; she was all shot 
to pieces. That in the opinion of the witness the El Vigo 
apartment is worth $65,000.00 and the property across 
the street was probably worth what it cost; that is $10,-
500.00; that the apartment and the garages were in the 
witness' opinion worth $75,000.00 (Tr. 80). That is the 
amount paid for the property and it has produced sub-
stantially five per cent net on the money invested. 
Upon cross-examination, Elias Hansen in effect 
testified that he thought his daughter's sights were too 
high when she said that the property was worth $100,-
000.00. That since the witness and his daughter owned 
the apartment they had an average of $45,000.00 of their 
own money invested in the property and that the net in-
come to them was maybe $2000.00 and that if that money 
had been invested in stocks and bonds twice that income 
would be received. That in making the income tax returns 
there would be deducted from the gross returns the cost 
of operation and the amount of interest paid on the 
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mortgage. When this is done there is about $2000.00 left, 
a little less than that last year when it was $1943.00 (Tr. 
81). 
That when the daughter of the witness and Mr. 
Beezley were first married they lived at the home of 
the witness and his wife for about a year and a half; that 
they probably did that to save paying rent; they moved 
from the home of the witness and his wife to the home 
they purchased on Harrison A venue. That the money 
the witness borrowed from his daughter was earned by 
her teaching school at Panguitch and Minersville; that in 
the witness' deposition he placed the amount owing his 
daughter at between $1200 and $1500 (Tr. 82). That the 
witness' best recollection is that he gave her a check to 
make the down p.ayment of $250.00, but he may be in 
error about the amount; that thereafter he made monthly 
payments; that the payments were made by check which 
were destroyed when he sold his home on 15th East; 
that he did not see the checks turned over to apply on the 
purchase of the Harrison Ave. property: that the money 
owing l\frs. Beezley was all paid off wlrile she and Mr. 
Beezley were occupying the Harrison Ave. property 
(Tr. 84). That the purchase price of the Monteray apart-
ment was $12,500.00 of which $5000.00 was the down pay-
ment; that as the witness recalls that property was sold 
subject to the 1nortgage; that the seller took a second 
mortgage on the balance of the purchase price; that later 
the mortgage to Tracy Loan & Trust Company was in-
creased so that all except about $300.00 of the purchase 
price was p.aid the seller. Later on reduction was n1ade 
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by the Seller on the $300.00 which had not been paid and 
the $300.00 was paid off (Tr. 84). That Bill signed a 
mortgage, but the witness did not think it was for $7500.-
00 ( Tr. 85). That when the property was sold, the pur-
chaser, a ~Ir. Stringer, insisted on Mr. Beezley signing 
the Deed because the Beezleys had been living in the 
apartment. That .after Mrs. Beezley obtained a deed to 
the property on 7th South she deeded a one-half interest 
to the witness. The apartment on 7th South was sold for 
$27,000.00 in 1945 ( Tr. 89). That out of the sale of the 
property on 7th South there was a commission paid to the 
real estate broker who made the sale, cost of bringing 
the abstract down to d.ate, some recording fees and es-
crow fees, the witness took his portion of the sale in a 
mortgage for $15,000.00. His daughter took all of her 
share in cash (Tr. 90). That the witness purchased some 
property immediately to the East of the property on 7th 
South, primarily to prevent some building close to the 
7th South property and thereby cutting of the light; that 
the $9500.00 mortgage the witness held on the 7th South 
property was released .and the amount thereof included 
in the $15,000.00 which the witness took as his share for 
the sale of that property. 
In his brief the defendant has directed the attention 
of the court to some portions of his testimony and that 
of his witnesses. Apparently attention is there directed 
to all of the evidence which appellant claims supports 
or tends to support his position. Therefore, we shall di-
rect the attention of the court to only those .additional 
portions of the evidence of the defendant which we deem 
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necessary for the court to consider in order to reach a 
proper conclusion. 
Mrs. Francis Carlson testified that from sometime 
in November 1952 until July 1953 she saw Mrs. Beezley 
helping to fix up the apartment occupied by Mr. Beezley 
(Tr. 95). That she saw her car parked outside all night 
( Tr. 96). Mrs. Jeanie Teresa Beezley Barney, a witness 
called by the defendant, testified that she is a niece of the 
defendant and lived with the Beezleys for some_ time 
( Tr. 97). She testified that she heard the defendant say 
that he was sorry that he had signed the note and mort-
gage in connection with the purchase of the Monteray 
apartment (Tr. 79). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Beezley testified that he 
didn't know whether or not he discussed financial affairs 
with Mrs. Beezley. He knew the Monteray apartment sold 
for $27,000.00 (Tr. 180). That he asked for an accounting 
from Mrs. Beezley after she filed a suit for a divorce. 
He did not ask for an accounting on the Monteray prior 
to the time the divorce suit was filed. That he did not 
file a federal or state income tax return on the income 
from the Monteray apartment (Tr. 180-181). That Mrs. 
Beezley was taking care of the bookkeeping (Tr. 181.) 
That he has never showed any income on his tax return 
for either the Monteray or the El \ ... igo; that he did not 
know about the $15,000.00 note taken by Mr. Hansen on 
the Monteray until he took his deposition (Tr. 181). 
That he made no payments on the notes that were given 
as evidence of money owing on the Monteray apartment 
except the payments made by Mrs. Beezley out of the 
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income from that apartment house (Tr. 184). That the 
Harrison property was rented for from $25.00 to $35.00 
per month and $60.00 per month after it was fixed up (Tr. 
184). That he did not know what part of the money re-
ceived from the sale of the Monteray went into the pur-
chase of the El Vigo apartment; that the witness did not 
know anything about the deal until he was sued for a 
divorce (Tr. 185). That the witness did not want to let 
Mr. Hansen know about his agreement with Mrs. Beezley 
in connection with the apartment houses (Tr. 187). That 
the witness did not know anything about where the money 
came from to pay for the property and the garages across 
the street and did not care (Tr. 188). 
Elias Hansen was rec.alled and identified 101 can-
celled checks, all of which, except possibly one for $250.00 
was paid for operating and applying on the purchase 
price of the El Vigo Apartment house and were, in ad-
dition to the down payment on the apartment. Such 
checks included the purchase of the property across the 
street and the construction of the g.arages. (Tr. 196) 
The total of the checks is $35,502.34 after deducting the 
check of $250.00 which may have been paid to Mrs. 
Beezley for her piano which was sold with the sale of 
the witness' home. The cancelled checks were received 
in evidence as Exhibit 29. That $8000.00 of the checks 
was for the property across the street. (Tr. 197). Later 
Mr. Hansen corrected his testimony about the $8000.00 
spent across the street ,and stated that the $8000.00 was 
for constructing the 14 garages and there was an ad-
ditional $2000.00 for the purchase of the land. The pro-
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perty across the street is a part of the property covered 
by the partnership agreement. 
Mrs. Beezley was recalled and testified that when 
she went to the hospital it was an emergency and that 
she tried to contact Mr. Beezley but was not successful; 
that she had no agreement with Mr. Beezley in connec-
tion with the Monteray apartment nor the El Vigo; that 
her father advanced the money to enable her to purchase 
the same (Tr. 202). She did say that if Mr. Beezley 
would quit his drinking they could have a little more 
security. That Mr. Beezley never asked the witness 
for an accounting as to either the ~fonteray or the El 
Vigo apartments prior to the divorce proceeding. (Tr. 
203). That when the letter written by Mr. Beezley, 
(Exhibit P-1) she did not say it was to show her father. 
That the witness brought her action for divorce because 
of the treatment by the defendant and because of his 
defaming her character. That the witness never had 
any marriage relations with Mr. Beezley after he 
filed his counterclaim for a divorce (Tr. 204). 
That the witness did not say her father would 
disinherit her if she did not get a divorce or 
that he had made a will; that she did not say that 
l\'Ir. Beezley was a cripple outside of his drink habit; 
He is not a cripple, he gets along fine. (Tr. 205). That 
she did not know why the defendant and 1frs. Barney 
should w:ant to defame her character; that ~Ir. Arm-
strong is a friend of the witness and was engaged to 
marry a Mrs. Hunsaker; that she n1et him at the 
apartment when she was on her way to meet ~irs. Bar-
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ney, the niece of the defendant, and Mr. Armstrong 
said he would take the witness to see Mrs. Barney. 
That he, Armstrong, further stated that he wished to 
show Mrs. Barney his apartment. That Mr. Armstrong 
took the niece out to dinner, that the niece was taking 
medicine and became sick; that on the other occasion 
testified to by the defendant, Mr. Armstrong came to 
the apartment to visit a friend who w.as ill and Mrs. 
Hunsaker came with him. That he left his overcoat 
and a small drink in a bottle that the witness has never 
kept company with Mr. Armstrong, that she never said 
that she wanted the tenants to think she w.as being 
beaten by Mr. Beezley. (Tr. 206). 
In connection with our discussion of this phase 
of the case, we direct the attention of the court to a 
number of misstatements contained in appellant's brief: 
Thus it is stated on page 16 of appellant's brief that 
Elias Hansen stated that Tracy Loan & Trust Company 
and Mr. Stringer wanted the Deed to Monteray apart-
ments signed by Mr. Beezley by reason of a homestead 
act, when the record shows that Tracy Loan & Trust had 
been paid off some three years prior thereto. What 
Elias H.ansen did testify to is this : I told him ( defen-
dant) when Mrs. Beezley wanted to buy that property 
(Monteray) we took it up with Tracy Loan & Trust 
Company, and the Tracy Loan & Trust Company, p.ar-
ticularly when the matter was refinanced, said they 
would not make .a loan and the deal would not go through 
unless Mr. Beezley signed the note and mortgage with 
Mrs. Beezley; that they might claim a homestead if 
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they lived there, and it was contrary to their practice 
to make a loan to a wife unless the husband signed, 
particularly if they were going to occupy the property. 
(Tr. 72 & 73). 
In the deposition taken in the cause (Tr. D-30) Mr. 
Hansen testified that when the Monteray was sold to 
Mr. Stringer he required Mr. and Mrs. Beezley to sign 
the deed because they had been living in the apartment 
and may claim a homestead the same as was done with 
the mortgage. To construe the language found on page 
12 of the deposition .to mean that Tracy Loan & Trust 
Company requested the Beezleys to sign the Deed to 
Stringer is wholly unwarranted. Of course, Tracy Loan 
& Trust Company was not interested in the property 
after the mortgage was paid off. 
On page 15 of appellant's brief, it is s.aid that de-
fendant was always claiming an interest in the property. 
There is no such evidence in P 53 D, Ex 30. There is 
some such language on page 53 where the plaintiff did 
say that she was a darned fool when she agreed to 
give Mr. Beezley .a deed to her interest in the apart-
ment on 9th South, El Dumpo. (Deposition of plain-
tiff page 52-53) In connection with her deposition she 
did say that he was always claiming he did have an 
interest and she claimed he did not. If that sentence 
is read in connection with the rest of her testimony, it 
is clear that such claim applied only to the period when 
the p.arties were having trouble about a divorce. (See 
Tr. 55-56). It is argued that because Mr. Beezley had 
made a claim to an interest in the El Vigo apartment 
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before July 17, 1953 when the attempted reconciliation 
was terminated, the plaintiff should not be offended 
about such a demand being made by the defendant. In 
the light of the fact that such demand was made after 
the defendant, by a written agreement, had agreed to 
give up any such claim and the fact that the demand 
was accompanied by a demand that plaintiff's father 
be required to vacate the apartment on 7th East would 
make the demand even less justified than it would 
otherwise have been. 
On page 12 of appellant's brief is cited a por-
tion of a letter written by plaintiff to defendant's sister. 
It would seem from the letter that defendant's sister 
was attempting to get the plaintiff and defendant to do 
something towards the support of defendant's brother 
Bob, and that the plaintiff was offering reasons why 
they were unable to do so. To say that the language 
there used indicated that the defendant had an interest 
in the Monteray apartment is stretching the language 
far beyond the breaking point. The fact that plain-
tiff's father was helping the Beezleys acquire a home 
falls far short of indicating that the defendant had al-
ready acquired an interest in a home, quite the con-
trary. On page 18 of appellant's brief, reference is 
made to the testimony of defendant's brother, Vernon. 
Such evidence is found on pages 209 to 212 of the 
Transcript. It may be noted that even the defendant 
does not have the temerity to claim that he and his 
wife ever owned the Monteray apartment. All he claims 
is that he should be found to be the owner of one-half of 
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plaintiff's interest therein. Moreover, I wonder what 
the defendant would have said if the plaintiff had ex-
plained to his brother that defendant did not have any 
interest in the property, but that the plaintiff was 
furnishing a home for the defendant. 
On being recalled, Mr. Beezley testified that he 
inadvertently filed his counterclaim against Mrs. Beezley; 
that he prepared the counterclaim long before it was 
filed; that he got Judge Van Cott to take out the Counter-
claim ; he signed the Counterclaim on July 17, 1953; 
that he believed the Counterclaim was signed a short 
time after the divorce Complaint was filed; that he 
knew there was .a Counterclaim for his equity in the 
apartment (Tr. 216) that the affidavit of service on 
Mr. Iverson states that the Counterclaim had been filed; 
that a Lis Pendens was also filed (Tr. 218). 
Elias Hansen was called in rebuttal and testified 
that Mr. Beezley in September 1953 did not say "I will 
be seeing you," nor did he, Mr. Hansen say "I hope not 
at the El Vigo." 
The plaintiff was recalled and testified that she 
kept the books of the apartments which were audited 
twice a year by her and her father; that she had never 
gone over her books of accounts as to the aparbnent 
houses with Mr. Beezley, nor has he ever asked to see 
the books. (Tr. 229, 230) 
The deposition of Mrs. Beezley and Mr. Hansen were 
received in evidence. In the main the evidence contained 
therein is the same as that at the trial and therefore 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
we shall not abstract the same. The depositions are 
marked Exhibit D 30 and 31. 
Before taking up our argument, we digress to call 
the attention of the court to the fact that no Designa-
tion of Record on Appeal was served upon counsel for 
respondent as required by Rule 75a of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. However, there does appear in the 
record a paper marked Designation and as having been 
filed on August 25, 1955. While the "designation" is not 
in conformity with the form suggested in Form 30 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we shall be content 
by calling the matter to the attention of the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
It will be observed from appellant's Brief that he 
relies upon three points. The respondent concedes that 
Point No. 3 is well taken, but we observe that this was 
not necess.ary to prosecute an appeal to accomplish what 
it there sought. So far as .appears the defendant could 
have conveyed a one-half interest in the property known 
as El Dumpo situated at 171 East 9th South back to 
the plaintiff without receiving an order so to do by this 
Court. We shall discuss the other two points in the order 
named. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE 
EVIDENCE IN THIS CAUSE SHOWED THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS GUILTY OF CRUELTY WHICH RENEWED THE 
ORIGINAL GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE AS ALLEGED IN 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT 
PERFORM THE MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS HE OWED TO 
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THE PLAINTIFF BUT ON THE CONTRARY HIS CONDUCT 
BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE ALLEGED RECONCILIA-
TION ·CONSTITUTED CRUELTY ENTITLING THE PLAIN-
TIFF TO A DIVORCE. 
We have heretofore at some length in this Brief 
directed the .attention of the Court to the acts of cruelty 
testified to by the plaintiff, by Mrs. Martin, by Elias 
Hansen and some of the evidence of the defendant and 
his witnesses. Before summarizing such evidence, it 
may be well to examine some of the authorities dealing 
with the law question here presented. 
The law with respect to under what circumstances 
condonation ceases to be available as a defense has been 
before the courts upon numerous occasions. This court 
has comparatively recently announced the law upon that 
matter in the case of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 Pac. 
( 2d) 1066, not yet in the Utah reports where it is said: 
"Where a spouse resumes misconduct sub-
sequent to condonation by the other spouse, the 
injured spouse in a divorce action can assert all 
prior misconduct as well as that occuring sub-
sequent to the condonation." 
The Court cites in support of its opinion the cases 
of Arnold v. Arnold, 75 Cal App (2d) 877; 174 Pac. 
(2d) 674; Burt v. Burt, 48 Wyo. 19; -!1 Pac. (2d); Thum 
v. Thum, 105 Colo. 352; 98 Pac. (2d) 279. A very full 
collection of the cases dealing with this question will 
be found in 32 A.L.R. (2d) 107. It would be a herculean 
task to review all the cases there cited. "\Ye have read a 
great number of them taken at random and find that 
they support the law as stated in the text of the an-
notation. 
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A1nong the principles of law stated are: 
"A condonation is not as readily inferred 
against a wife as against a husband." page 113 
"It is commendable for an injured spouse to 
continue cohabitation with a spouse who is com-
miting a series of cruel acts or indignations where 
the injured spouse hopes that the other will mend 
his ways and that the marriage may be saved 
by patient forebearance, .and many cases hold that 
such cohabitation does not constitute condona-
tion where the conduct continues. It has also been 
said that a wife's endurance of unkind treatment 
in the hope that her husband will reform should 
never be allowed to weaken her right to relief." 
See page 131 of the above volume of A.L.R .. and 
numerous cases there cited. 
It is often said that a condonation is conditional or 
that it is only conditional forgiveness. Page 161 of the 
above volume of A.L.R. "It is obvious that the subsequent 
misconduct which will avoid the effect of a condonation 
of cruelty need not of itself be sufficient as a ground 
for divorce, otherwise a divorce would be granted on the 
ground of the subsequent conduct and there would be 
little point in bothering with a determination as to 
whether there has been a revocation of the condonation." 
See 166 of the above Vol. of A.L.R. and cases cited from 
numerous states in the support of the text. 
We have taken the pains to take at random and read 
a number of the cases cited in the above mentioned 
volume of A.L.R. and the same are in accord with the 
statement of the law above taken from the annotation. 
The authorities generally are to the effect that con-
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donation blots out the offense condoned, so that any 
act of condonation that is so blotted out is not available 
by way of incrimination in a suit by the spouse whose 
offense was condoned against the condoning spouse for 
his or her subsequent misconduct. 17 Am. Jur. 272, Sec. 
240 and cases cited in foot notes. 
Following is a summary of the evidence which pre-
vents defendant from defeating plaintiff's action for 
a divorce because of the claim of condonation. 
The plaintiff took a course at the University of 
Utah as to what might be done to cure Mr. Beezley from 
the drink habit. (Tr. 30) She prevailed upon him to 
join Alcoholic Anonymous, but in order to get him to 
join, he required her to join. (Tr. 31-53). Sometimes 
after the action w.as brought the Beezleys, in a limited 
way, resumed their marriage relations with the agree-
ment that such resumption would not be used against 
the plaintiff if they were unable to effect a permanent 
reconciliation. (Deposition of Mrs. Beezley, Page 5) 
Mr. Beezley denied any such agreement. The case was 
continued from time to time upon the request of Mr. 
Beezley and in order to get one of such continuance 
he wrote the letter, Exhibit 1, wherein the defendant 
agreed that he would not contest the granting of a divorce 
and that Mrs. Beezley should have the property on 7th 
East known as the El Vigo and defendant would have 
the property on 9th South known as El Dumpo. After 
the .attempted reconciliation, the defendant filed his 
Answer and Counterclaim which he claims had been 
prepared for some time and in which he sought a divorce 
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from the plaintiff. In such counterclaim he charged 
plaintiff with various acts of Inisconduct and sought to 
acquire one-half of plaintiff's interest in the El Vigo; 
that the immediate c.ause of the failure of the permanent 
reconciliation was the demand that plaintiff deed one-
half of her interest in the El Vigo to the defendant 
and get plaintiff's father removed therefrom. (Tr. 32-35) 
Such demand was made notwithstanding a compliance 
therewith was prob.ably impossible. That after the final 
break up between the Beezleys and in September 1953, 
the defendant went to the office of the plaintiff's father, 
told him that a reconciliation could not be had between 
him and his wife unless he was given a one-half interest 
in the El Vigo apartment and also told the father of the 
plaintiff that he had taken his daughter home drunk 
and that when he came home one night his wife was in 
the apartment house with some one; that he heard 
voices; that when he got into the apartment she was 
gone and that she could not have gotten out of the 
apartment without assistance. (Tr. 78-79). That not-
withstanding plaintiff's father informed the defendant 
that he would dispose of the El Vigo apartment if de-
fendant were to acquire an interest therein, the de-
fendant continued in his attempt to acquire such an 
interest, notwithstanding the income from that apart-
ment was the sole source of the support of the plain-
tiff. That if there had been any doubt about the unwilling-
ness of the plaintiff's father to be in a business to which 
the defendant was interested, such doubt was obviously 
removed by the $50,000.00 suit brought by the defendant 
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against the plaintiff's father. To say that it was not 
cruelty for the defendant to attempt to deprive plain-
tiff of her sole source of support by his flimsy claim of 
having an interest in the El Vigo apartment is to ignore 
the obvious. 
That when the defendant and his attorney were 
taking the deposition of the plaintiff, they took turns in 
asking her about intercourse with the defendant, there 
were at least 15 times such questions were asked not-
withstanding they knew such questions were embarrass-
ing; the last question asked the plaintiff was by the de-
fendant who asked how many times she had had inter-
course with him after the suit was brought. It was only 
upon the advice of plaintiff's attorney that she refused 
to answer that brought an end to such questions. Ex. 
P-30 page 5, 6, 8, 12, 16, 20, 21, 38, 39, 40, 42, 47, 48, 70, 7L 
During the course of the trial, the defendant in 
great detail testified to all of his real and imaginary 
grievances; sought to make out a case of perjury against 
plaintiff because of what she said in a case brought by 
the Beezleys against certain officers of Salt Lake City. 
While testimony there relied upon falls far short of being 
perjury it ill becomes the defendant to make such a claim 
if as the plaintiff testified her testimony in that ease was 
given upon the advice of the defendant. See Exhibit 
D-25 and Tr. 116 and 119. 
The law is well settled that if a condonance is 
brought about by fraud the one guilty of the fraud 
vitiates the condonation. It is so held in a number of 
the cases collected in 32 A.L.R. (2d) 107 supra. In light 
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of the fact that the defendant sought and was granted 
numerous continuances and the fact that in the letter 
Exhibit P-1, the defendant agreed to give up all claim 
to El Vigo apartment and the further fact that he is 
here seeking a one-half of plaintiff's interest in the El 
Vigo apartments indicate that defendant's primary con-
cern during the period when the parties were apparently 
attempting to bring about a condonation was to secure 
plaintiff's property rather than to bring about a per-
manent reconciliation. The plaintiff so construed his 
action. (Tr. 54) 
It will be seen that in the evidence of defendant 
he testified to all of his claimed grievances and the 
claimed shortcomings of his wife. If as he contends 
Mrs. Beezley condoned his acts it is indeed difficult to 
understand why her acts were not condoned also, but 
in his evidence and brief he claims that his own behavior 
was condoned but not that of his wife. It is obvious that 
to require the plaintiff to continue to be the wife of the 
defendant would be doing her a grave injustice and that 
the evidence is more than ample to support the findings, 
conclusions and decree of the trial court awarding her a 
divorce. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE DE-
FENDANT AND PLAINTIFF HAD A PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT AS TO THE EL VIGO APARTMENT OR 
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD ANY INTEREST THEREIN. 
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It may be noted at the outset that even if it were 
true that plaintiff and defendant had an agreement as 
to the El Vigo apartment, such fact would not justify 
the awarding of any interest in that apartment to the 
defendant. It is provided by U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-5 that 
when a divorce is granted the court may make such 
distribution of the property .as shall be reasonable and 
proper. The evidence in this case shows these facts: 
The El Vigo apartment was purchased in 1945 for the 
sum of $65,000.00, of which amount $19,500.00 was paid 
down and a mortgage given for the purchase price in 
the sum of $45,500.00. (Tr. 74). A tract of land was 
purchased across the street from the apartment and 14 
garages built thereon at a cost of about $10,000.00. The 
plaintiff's father had advanced the $10,000.00 for the 
purchase of the land and building the garages, and an 
additional sum of about $23,000.00 for buying new furni-
ture, stoves, refrigerators and payments made by him 
on the mortgage. (Tr. 35, 75 and Exhibit P-2 and P-29) 
There was owing at the time of the trial $5300.00 on the 
purchase money mortgage; $2700.00 on furniture (Tr. 
62) and $2700.00 on conversion of the heating system to 
gas. Thus the total indebtedness of the partnership at 
the time of the trial was about $43,700.00 It had a net 
income as shown by the partnership return of about 
$2000.00 per year; the return for the year before the 
trial was $1943.00. 1\Ir. Hansen placed the value of the 
apartment and the land across the street at $75,000.00 
which is the price paid. (Tr. 80). Thus after Mrs. Beezely 
was paid her monthly allowances for operating the apart-
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ment there was very little remaining to apply on the 
investment. In this connection it should be noted that 
in the income tax returns no interest can be deducted 
for interest paid a partner. In their pleadings the 
Beezleys placed the value of the apartment at $100,-
000.00 and the court so found its value to be. 
The defendant placed the value of the El Dumpo 
apartment which was awarded to him at $15,000.00, the 
money owing thereon at $158.47 and the monthly income 
therefrom $200.00. (Tr. 131-132). The plaintiff has no 
income except that which she receives from the apart-
ment house which she operated. The defendant is an 
attorney at law .and practicing his profession. His in-
come is not shown by the evidence. It will thus be seen 
that if the El Vigo apartment is worth $100,000.00 as 
the court found and the indebtedness against it is $43,-
700.00, the net value would be $56,300.00 of which plain-
tiff's share would have a value of $28,150.00. The value 
of the property on 7th East if fixed at the purchase 
price and as testified to by Mr. Hansen, the equity of 
the plaintiff after deducting the indebtedness would be 
$15,650.00. 
Obviously the value that may be placed on the 
apartment house does not aid the plaintiff in making 
a livelihood so long as she operates the same. It is 
the means derived therefrom that is of primary concern 
to one who relies on the income for support. With pro-
perty producing only $2000.00 net a year, plaintiff will 
do well to get along if her father is to be paid 4% interest 
on the amount he has invested in excess of plaintiff's 
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investment. The evidence shows without conflict that 
defendant has made no p.ayment on either the Monteray 
or the El Vigo apartment. The payments have all been 
made by the plaintiff and her father. In such case the 
presumption is that the person making the payments are 
in equity the owners of the property paid for by them. 
Anderson v. Coercone 54 Utah 345; 185 Pac. 586. The 
only claim made by the defendant as to payments on the 
Monteray apartment is that he signed a note with the 
plaintiff for $3000.00 at the time the apartment was 
purchased. (Ex. D-17) . Later that mortgage was released 
(Ex. D-19). A new mortgage for $7000.00 was given 
to take up the $3000.00 note and mortgage together with 
a mortgage that was on the property when the purchase 
was made by the plaintiff. (Ex. D-20 and D-21). Some 
of the note and mortgage for $7000.00 w.as paid out of 
the income derived from the operation of the Monteray 
apartment, the balance was paid by plaintiff's father. 
Defendant makes no claim to the contrary. (Tr. 183). 
It is provided by U.C.A. 1953, 95-5-1 that an interest 
in real est.ate must be established by an instrument in 
writing or by operation of law. Among the Utah cases 
holding that an interest in real estate must be shown 
by a written instrument are: Price v. Lloyd 31 Utah 86; 
86 Pac. 767; Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah 575; 206 
Pac. 262; Moffat v. Hoffntan, 61 Utah ±82; 214 Pac. 308. 
So also an oral agreement to 1nake such a contract must 
be in writing. Pau.l v. Layne etal, 9 Cal (2d) 561, 71 
Pac. (2d) 817; Birdzcll l'. Utah Oil Refg. Co. 242 Pac. 
(2d) 578; Collet v. Godrich, 231 Pac. (2d) 730; Hawaiian 
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Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp. 207 Pac. (2d) 794. 
Apparently appellant in his brief bases his claim to 
an interest in the El Vigo apartment by operation of 
law. An imposing array of cases is cited in his brief in 
support of such claim. The difficulty with defendant's 
claim in such p.articular is that the cited cases do not 
support his position. 
At the outset before one may successfully establish 
a claim founded on an oral contract, it must be made 
to appear that there is such a contract. Skeen v. Van 
Sickle 80 Ut. 419; 425; 15 Pac. (2d) 344. It was testified 
to by the defendant that he and the plaintiff agreed 
to go into a partnership. The plaintiff denied that 
there was any such agreement as to either the El Vigo 
or Monteray apartment. In his testimony defendant 
went into the purchase of the Harrison Ave. property, 
the property on 9th A venue and the property on 9th 
South, referred to as the El Dumpo. It does not follow 
that bec.ause the plaintiff and defendant were jointly 
interested in the above mentioned property that they 
were jointly interested in either the Monteray or the 
El Vigo apartments, indeed when the facts in this case 
are all considered, the contrary is made apparent. Even 
though the evidence of the defendant is taken at face 
value, no one c.an say how long the so called agreement 
should continue, what money or services were to be per-
formed by each of the parties thereto, what money should 
be advanced by them, how long should the partnership 
exist, what property should it cover, who were to as-
sume and pay the obligations of the undertaking. In 
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short a mere oral agreement that persons will become 
partners does not constitute such .a contract as the court 
can enforce. To do so the court would first be compelled 
to make a contract for the partners. That the Court 
may not do. 
The only contribution the defendant claims to have 
made to the operation of the Monteray apartment was 
that he did some painting; that he took out the garbage 
and watered the lawn and took part in a beautification 
association. The defendant testified that the purpose 
of the association was to keep out undesirable people 
and be.autify the area in which the Monteray apartment 
is situated. However, he does not inform us of any 
specific accomplishments. (Tr. 139-141). After the 
Beezleys moved to the El Vigo apartment, the de-
fendant did nothing towards its care or operation. (Tr. 
12-13). 
During the period the plaintiff and defendant have 
been married, they lived at the home of the plaintiff's 
p.arents for about 2% to 3 years. (Tr. 20 and 21). That 
from November 1937 until 1945 they lived in the Monte-
ray apartment when they moved into the El Vigo apart-
ment where they resided until this action was brought. 
During all that tiine the plaintiff furnished a home for 
the defendant without any investment or other expense 
to him. In the meanti1ne, the home on Harrison A \e. 
and later the property known on 9th South as the El 
Dumpo was rented .and the rent used to pay for money 
owing for the purchase of those properties. The rents 
above all being collected by the defendant. (Tr. 21, 22, 
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23 and 27). It will thus be seen that it has been possible 
for the Beezleys to acquire and pay for the property 
on 9th South known as the El Dumpo because of the fact 
that the home in which the plaintiff and defendant have 
lived for all of their married life, except the short time 
they lived at the Harrison Ave. property, was provided 
by the plaintiff. 
The defendant at great length went into the various 
transactions had with respect to the Harrison Ave. 
property, the property on 9th A venue and the property 
on 9th South, but nothing was said about the financial 
.affairs of the Monteray or El Vigo apartments. He 
knew that Mrs. Beezley was keeping books containing 
the operation of those apartments, yet during those 
many years he did not even inquire about whether the 
apartments were being operated at a profit or a loss. 
He never reported any income from either of the apart-
ments, yet as .a lawyer he must know that he was required 
to do so if he had any interest in those properties. (Tr. 
180 to 191). The state federal law requires that partner-
ship returns must be made without regard to whether 
or not an income is actually received by the owner of 
an interest in .a partnership. See Federal Internal Reve-
nue Code, Chapter 1, Supplement F, Sec. 181 et seq. and 
U.C.A.1953, 59-14-21, et seq, also 59-14-43. 
The defendant further testified that the partner-
ship was kept a secret because of the dislike of him by 
the plaintiff's parents. Obviously if such fact existed 
that would be a reason why he would have had it reduced 
to writing. Moreover, one of the cardinal principles of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
46 
the law of partnership is that each must exercise to-
wards the other the utmost good faith. It is so provided 
in U.C.A. 1953, 48-1-19. It is so held in Sharp v. Sharp, 
54 Ut. 262; 180 Pac. 580. See also 40 Am. Jur. 208, 
Sec. 113, and numerous cases there cited. If the testi-
mony of the defendant is to be believed it necessarily 
follows that he prevailed upon the plaintiff to secure 
financial aid from her father in order that the defendant 
might have a home in which to live, and if the venture 
proved profitable that he may enjoy the profits with-
out sharing any losses if the venture proved a failure. 
1N e have probably extended our argument about 
the mythical partnership claimed by the defendant to 
have existed between him and the plaintiff longer than 
necessary, but we have done so to show that when the 
defendant claimed such a contract to exist and that un-
less plaintiff conveyed one-half of her interest in the El 
Vigo .apartment no reconciliation could be had, plaintiff 
sustained the mental shock and suffering as testified to 
by her. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO DEFENDANT 
PLAINTIFF'S ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE 9TH SOUTH 
PROPERTY KNOWN AS THE EL DUMPO. 
We indicated at the outset that plaintiff concedes 
that the court erred in awarding to defendant her one-
half interest in the El Dumpo. To aid defendant in such 
claim, it will be noted that no issue is raised by the 
pleadings as to that property. Moreover we are not 
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familiar with any case in this jurisdiction where the 
property is taken from a wife and awarded to the hus-
band. If the husband is in necessitous circumstances it 
would seem that under the laws of Utah that may be 
done. However, the plaintiff does not resist defendant's 
own admission and contention that the court erred in 
awarding to the defendant the one-half interest of the 
plaintiff in the property on 9th South and that such 
error should be corrected. It is submitted that other-
wise the decree should be affirmed with costs to respon-
dent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GRANT IVERSON 
Attorney for Respondent 
Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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